THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
NEITHER SWORD NOR PURSE?
Worrall F. Mountain*
Whoever attentively considers the different government in
which they are separatedfrom each other, the judiciary, from the
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a
capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses
the honors but holds the sword of the community. The legislature
not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the
duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated, The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of
the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judginent; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON**

It is familiar constitutional dogma that, at both federal and state
levels, our form of government embraces what is commonly known as
the doctrine of the separation of powers. This principle is expressly
embodied in the New Jersey constitution which provides that
[t]he powers of the government shall be divided among three
distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except as expressly provided in this Constitution. 1
Despite the precision of this language, courts and commentators
substantially agree that compartmentalization of all government powers into discrete legislative, executive and judicial spheres never has
been truly accomplished, either in New Jersey or elsewhere, and
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No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
N.J. CONST. art. 3, para. 1. Although there is no similar express statement of this doctrine in the Federal Constitution, the concept of separation is implicit in the textual commitment
of the totality of the "legislative," "executive" and "judicial" powers of the United States to
"Congress," the "President" and the "Supreme Court," respectively. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II,
III. However, even prior to ratification of the Federal Constitution, it was clear that complete
autonomy of departments was neither practicable nor intended. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J.
Madison).
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probably never can be. 2 The exigencies of governance stand in the
way of such precise arrangements. There always has been some overlapping, some apparent intrusion of one branch of government into a
3
sphere of activity explicitly alloted to some other branch.
Notwithstanding the unavoidable overlapping and blending of delegated powers, the doctrine of their separation has remained an ongoing, if somewhat amorphous, aspect of our polity. But recent
developments -judicial reform of municipal zoning, 4 state-wide
financing of public education, 5 and school busing to achieve racial
balance, 6 among others-bid fair to test anew the validity of this
principle.
While their factual circumstances differ widely, such notorious
cases of judicial interwvntion can be viewed as variations on a theme.
A typical scenario may evolve as follows: The judiciary by adjudication determines that a particular condition or state of affairs is in violation of the Constitution. The latter explicitly or by reasonable inferences imposes the responsibility to correct the condition either upon
the legislature or the executive-the two so-called political branches
of government. For whatever reason, the appropriate political branch
does not respond or responds only inadequately. Thus the unconstitutional condition is allowed to persist. A person having standing to
complain comes before the appropriate court, calls attention to the
earlier adjudication of unconstitutionality and to the persistence of the
offending condition. The court is then asked to afford relief. There is
no way for the court to grant this relief without trenching upon a
power constitutionally allotted to another branch. What response
should the court make to the aggrieved litigant?
There would seem to be several alternatives. The court could
refuse to act. In so doing it would presumably point out that, since
the judicial power is essentially limited to adjudication 7 and since a
2 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 23, at 16 (1978); Gibbons, The

Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 5
SETON HALL L. REV. 435, 435-36 (1974).
3 As one example of this intermingling of powers, consider the administrative process.
There a single regulatory, agency may legislate by exercise of its rule-making power, execute by
its active regulation of an industry or area of government and perform the judicial function
when holding hearings to adjudicate rights and punish infractions.
' E.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192
(1977); Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
5 See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). For
full procedural history of this case, see note 17 infra.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass.), stay of implementation denied, 523
F.2d 917 (1st Cir. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (lst. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
' While this is true in the abstract, the position of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
should be especially noted. The grant of judicial power to the courts-what is commonly called
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determination of unconstitutionality has already been made, separation of powers principles forbid it to proceed firther. It might add
that the appropriate relief should be sought, not from the judiciary,
but rather, directly from that branch of government having the obligation and the power legitimately to afford relief. There is no doubt
that this would be the orthodox answer, as well as the one finding
most support in history, precedent and constitutional theory.
In the alternative, a court might choose to order some selected
representative of the apparently derelict branch of government to
grant the relief sought. The adoption of such a course clearly presents
grave problems. A court does not normally, either directly or indirectly, order a legislature to pass a particular law or counsel the
executive with respect to molding policy or enforcing the laws. An
exception appears to occur when the judiciary requires legislative
help in order to meet obligations that have.been constitutionally imposed upon it. This, for instance, is the case when, in order to meet a
constitutional demand, the judiciary requires funds it does not possess. In such a situation, the court may properly ask the legislature
for fiscal assistance. Analysis reveals an important constitutional distinction between the court's order in the first instance and its request
for finds in the second.
The New Jersey constitution places upon the supreme court the
obligation to "make rules governing the administration of all courts in
the State."
In attempting to meet this constitutional obligation, the
court may encounter a need for finds in excess of those originally
appropriated by the legislature. The judiciary is entirely within its
rights-it is acting legitimately-when it makes a request of the
legislature for such funds. It must have them if it is to perform properly a constitutional function that has been entrusted to it. Not to
seek such fiscal aid when needed would be to abjure a constitutional
responsibility.

the power of adjudication -appears
in article 6, section 1, paragraph 1: "The judicial power
shall be vested in a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, County Courts and inferior courts of
limited jurisdiction." In addition to the grant of traditional judicial power, the supreme court is
invested with certain legislative and administrative powers. Article 6, section 2, paragraph 3
provides
[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts
in the State, and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts.
The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law
and discipline of persons admitted.
This notwithstanding the language of article 3, paragraph I. See text accompanying note 1
supra.
s N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2, para. 3.
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On the other hand, suppose the constitutional obligation to be
that of the legislature. An example might be the duty of the legislature under our state constitution to provide a thorough and efficient
education. 9 Where the judiciary perceives that the legislature has
failed to meet this obligation due to a lack of available revenues, what
should be its response? All would agree that there should be al adjudication of unconstitutionality. Should the judiciary go further and
request or direct the legislature to provide necessary funding?
Pause here to observe the difference between a request for funds
required to meet the court's own constitutional obligation and a demand that funds be raised and appropriated to meet what the court
has declared to be a legislative obligation. The\, are in no sense the
same nor should they, be thought to be. In one case the court is doing
what it must to fulfill a duty imposed upon it by the constitution. It
can neither levy a tax nor appropriate funds from the public treasury.
It must turn to the legislature for help. If the request is reasonable,
presumably help will be forthcoming. It has been often remarked that
"legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great a degree as the courts." 10 The situation is
entirely different when the court directs that funds be raised and appropriated to meet what the court itself has decided to be a legislative duty. Here the court is seeking by indirect coercion to compel a
particular exercise of powers properly belonging to another branch of
government.

Finally, let us consider a third alternative. Suppose that instead
of ordering another branch of government to act, the judiciary itself
undertakes to correct the unconstitutional condition. If money is
needed, the problem of legitimacy described above is compounded
by institutional limitations. Courts are in no way equipped for such
an undertaking. They, do not have the facilities, the manpower or the
expertise to put in train a project as large as the restructuring of a
school or prison system. Nor can they take account of all monetary
needs, as does the legislature, and determine fiscal priorities intelligently. In attempting to do so the judiciary would become subjected, almost perforce, to pressure from special interest groups and
otherwise find itself politically engaged.
This judicial encroachment on legislative and executive prerogative poses a serious dilemma for courts, and indeed for the people of
9 For discussion, see text accompanying notes 17-25 ibfra.
10

Missouri,

Kan. & Tex.

R.

v.

May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904);

McCutcheon v. State

Bldg. Auth., 13 N.J. 46, 79, 97 A.2d 663, 680 (1953) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
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the state and nation as well. Parenthetically, it is not entirely clear
why it has only lately emerged as a problem. It may perhaps be due
to the rapidly evolving mores of our times. As recently as 1956 an
eminent constitutional authority could say with perfect truth, "[y]et
all that courts can do is to say something." 11 This seems no longer
to be true but we must look to the social historian to explain the
reasons for the change.
In the 1920's it was customary to remark that "[the least government is the best government." A hands-off, laissez-faire attitude
prevailed and characterized government's relationship to the individual. The depression of the 1930's and the New Deal did much to
change this, as did, to a lesser extent, the Second World War. In any
event, impelled by forces too strong to resist, government became
involved in the lives of individual citizens to a degree this country
had previousl' neither known nor foreseen. Benefits such as social
security, unemployment compensation, medicare and the like now
provide hitherto unknown governmental aid, while vastly increased
taxes are a constant reminder of its source. Citizen involvement with
government has become more prevalent and citizen demand upon
government to supply and provide has become more exigent. Inevitably the ensuing problems have led to the courtroom. As de TocquIeville remarked \,ears ago, "[sIcarcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." 12 Today, the same may be said with respect to
economic, social and personal problems as well. Whatever the reason
may be, courts now are called upon to answer more questions and
resolve more problems than every before.
Returning to the particular issue posed above, if the court adopts
the first alternative and stays its hand, what are the results? The most
obvious one is that the unconstitutional condition will continue to
exist, absent any relief from the appropriate political branch. Constitutional rights will still be denied to some persons. There is no way
of minimizing the significance of this, nor should we seek to do so. It
must be regarded as a failure, at least temporarily, and a very serious
one.
On the other hand, what is to be gained by pursuing a course of
judicial self-restraint? I submit that far and away the most important
gain is that the courts will have retained their "power of legitimacy" 13

11 T.

POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 8 (1956).

12 DE TOCQUEVILLE,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, i, 280 (1956).

13 The most important quality of law in a free society is the power to command ac-

ceptance and support fron the commUnitv So as to render force unnecessary, or
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and will be seen to have done so. Nowhere is it said in the constitution that if there is a failure on the part of the legislature or the
executive to meet a constitutional command, then the judiciary has
the duty and the power to remedy the failure in fact. 14 The task of
the courts seems to terminate with adjudication. 15
Suppose, however, a state school system or prison system is deficient in ways and to an extent that lead to an adjudication of constitutional insufficiency as to the operation of the system. Suppose further
that adequate correction is impossible without a substantial outlay of
public funds which are not available and which the legislature neglects or refuses to provide. What avenues are available to a court
seeking to fashion a remedy for an aggrieved party?
The power to tax as well as the power to appropriate revenues
are legislative. 16 No one would seriously contend that the)' reside in
the judiciary, and, as far as I know, in no such situation has a court
actually undertaken to levy a tax itself or to appropriate money from
the public treasury. It is clear, however, that should such a result be
desired, it is possible to achieve it by indirection.
In Robinson v. Cahill,17 our supreme court held that, as then
financed, the state school system violated a provision of the state consitution, 18 which directs that
necessary only upon a small scale against a few recalcitrants. I call this quality the
"power of legitimacy' because it appears to attach to those commands of established
organs of government which are seen to result from their performance in an authorized fashion of the functions assigned to them. Such commands, and only such,
are legitimate. A.
ERNMENT

Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN Gov-

103 (1976).

14 Of course, it does not necessarily follow from an absence of explicit reference in the
constitution that a particular judicial power does not exist. The power of judicial review, for
instance, is nowhere stated in the constitution. But Chief Justice Marshall found it to be there
nonetheless. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
'5 Strictly speaking, one might take issue with this statement. For instance, after entry of
judgment, a court, at the behest of a litigant, often does a variety of things to effect satisfaction
of the award. Such action may include the sale of the defendant's lands and chattels; it may
require the defendant to reveal the location of hidden assets and may result in his going to jail

for contempt of court. But it will be seen that here the judician, is exercising powers that are
inherently its own. It does not invoke or purport to exercise an), power traditionally in the

keeping of another branch of government. Such actions on the part of the judiciary, whether or
not strictly judicial, are nonetheless clearly legitimate.
16 Gallena v. Scott, 11 N.J. 231, 239, 94 A.2d 312, 315 (1953) ("judicial authority cannot
compel an appropriation'").

17 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, aff'd on rehearing,jurisdiction
retained, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), order entered, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6, order entered, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975), republished, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713, order vacated,
69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129, injunction issued, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457, injunction dissolved,
70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).

18 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297-98.
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[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the
instruction of all the children in this State between the ages of five
and eighteen years.' 9
In 1975, clearly as a reluctant response to this decision, the legislature did enact the Public School Education Act of 1975.20 Its facial
constitutionality was sustained, but only upon the assumption that it
would be full-\ funded. 21 Everyone recognized and agreed that
realistically the only way the money could be raised to finance the
school system that had been mapped out by this legislation was by
the imposition of a statewide income tax. Time went by and nothing
was done. 2 2 Finally, more than three years after the initial adjudication of unconstitutionality, the supreme court entered an order directing that "[o]n and after July 1, 1976, every public officer, state,
count\, or municipal, is hereby enjoined from expending an\ funds for
the support of an\, free public school." 2 3 The order had the desired
effect. The legislature did enact a statewide income tax. 2 4 The
schools did not close and the necessary funds were raised. 25 This
result may be viewed, at first blush, as a significant victor,; for those
who believe that courts should in fact do the kind of thing that was
done here. But there are at least two ways of looking at what was
done. One might say that, given the constitutional duty of the legislature to fund the school program, the intercession of someone to protect the constitutional rights of deprived citizens was required. No
instrumentality of government other than the judiciary seemed to be
in any position to afford relief. The courts were, or thought the\
were, in such a position. They did act. The goal was accomplished.
But the matter may also be examined from another .viewpoint: The
court successfully coerced 26 the legislature into doing what it, the

19 N.J. CONsST. art. 8, § 4, para. 1.
20 Public School Education Act of 1975, [1975] N.J. Laws ch. 212, at 871 (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18A: 7A-1 to -33 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)).
21 69 N.J. 449, 454, 355 A.2d 129, 134 (1976).
22

See generally Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case Study in Judicial Self-Legitimization, 8

RUT.-CAM.

L.J. 508 (1977); Survey of the 1975-76 New Jersey Supreme Court Termi-School

Finance Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 814 (1977).
23 70 N.J. 155,
24

160, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (1976).
New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act, [1976] N.J. Laws ch. 47, at 285 (codified at N.J.

STAT. ANN. §§ 54A:1-1 to :9-28 (West 1977-1978)).
2' The writer of this paper, as a member of the supreme court, dissented from the judgment
that would have compelled the schools to close. 70 N.J. at 161, 358 A.2d at 460.
26 "'The.fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of
government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,
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legislature, did not wish to do and what it probably would not have
otherwise done. Legislators are elected by the people; in New Jersey,
judges are not. Does the coercion of the former by the latter suggest
there may have been a failure of democratic principle?
It is true that there was no direct judicial exertion of the power
to tax or the power to appropriate. It would have been a little
frightening but very interesting to have discovered what the reaction
of the public would have been had the judiciary sought, directly, to
exercise one or both of these powers. What if, in a situation such as

that described above, the legislature simply had refused to provide
the necessary funding? I think the position of the court would have
been an embarassing and unenviable one. Not that the judiciary
should fear unpopularity. It does not. But its share of responsibility
for the resulting impasse would surely have called pointed attention
to what many would look upon as improper intrusion. The court
would have faced a serious charge-that in seeking to accomplish a
desirable goal, it had nonetheless exceeded its constitutional powers.
As one commentator upon this case observed:
Only if the court is perceived as institutionally viable and respectable will its decisions remain authoritative. Maintenance of this
perception in turn requires that the court act within its own institutional )oundaries by respecting the doctrine of separation of powers. In this, the court is peculiarly the master of its own fate, since
it has historically and necessarily been designed as "the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, the protestations of another
'equal' branch of the government to the contrary notwithstanding."
Misapprehension of its role as interpreter, however, leaves the
court susceptible to action beyond its power in remedying perceived constitutional violations. While the rights of individual litigants may thus be upheld, the cost is abuse of the judicial process
and distortion of the judiciary's relationship with the other
branches of government. Action at the outer reaches of judicial
power therefore requires serious consideration of both the practical
and legal consequences of a decision. When the court makes an
intuitive judgment, not only must the judgment be supported by
reasoned elaboration, but a respect for the process of legitimization
is necessary in order for the court to remain an authoritative, and
27
not become an authoritarian, decisionmaker.

of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question."
Humphrey's Extr. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (emphasis added).
27 Note, supra note 22, at 523.
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A proper and effective solution to the whole problem is not easy
to come by. It seems clear, however, that fashioning methods designed to attain the ultimate fulfillment of such constitutional obligations as may have been imposed upon the political branches of government should form no part of the duties of the judiciary. Its
function in this area properly ends with adjudication.
The final resolution of the problem, under our system of government, appears to rest with the people. If the highest court in the
state interprets the state constitution in a way which conflicts with
the popular will, the people may amend the constitution to conform
with their wishes. In the alternative, where a constitutional deprivation persists because of lack of legislative or executive response, there
may be effective resort to the polls.
Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for
changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citi-

zens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that
elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties com28
mitted to them.

A court is acting within its constitutional competence when it adjudges an elected representative or group of respresentatives delinquent in the discharge of duties; but a court may not do more than
this without calling its own legitimacy into question and endangering
the system of which it is a part. Once there has been an adjudication,
separation of powers principles mandate that responsibility for insuring adherence to the constitution rest with one of the political
branches of government and not with the judiciary. The ultimate
sanction for continued refusal to meet a constitutional obligation must
lie with the people.
28 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).

